Prime ministerial power is always contingent, based on the utilisation of personal and institutional resources, subject to various formal and informal constraints. Parliament is both a political resource to be utilised, but also a veto-player. In the absence of formal mechanisms setting out the requirements for UK prime ministerial accountability to parliament, a fluid and essentially personalised relationship has developed. Regular prime ministerial appearances before the House of Commons Liaison Committee, begun in 2002, have added to parliament's scrutiny toolkit. This article considers the accountability of the prime minister to parliament by analysing the emergence and development of the Liaison Committee evidence sessions, and draws on interviews with participants and examination of the session transcripts, in order to assess the value of this scrutiny mechanism within the broader framework of prime ministerial-legislative relations.
Introduction
Standing at the apex of the ministerial 'cone' that characterizes UK central government (Mackintosh 1962, 452) , the prime minister is an obviously powerful political actor, and one who prompts extensive debate both about how executive powers are utilised and how they are constrained. Hennessy (2000, 6) argued that this debate 'lies at the heart of the British constitution', involving as it does 'the necessary restraint of the potentially overmighty powers' that are wielded by prime ministers. H.H. Asquith commented in 1926 that 'the office of the prime minister is what its holder chooses and is able to make of it ' (in Hennessy 2000, 3) . Crucially, this insight applies not just to the powers of the prime minister, but also to the structures of parliamentary scrutiny and oversight to which the prime minister is subjected.
In 2002, then prime minister Tony Blair facilitated a significant realignment of parliamentary scrutiny infrastructure when he agreed to appear twice a year before the House of Commons Liaison Committee -the committee comprising the chairs of the select committees -to answer questions about government policy and decision making. Traditionally an organisation focused on administering the select committee system, the Liaison Committee had positioned itself as a pivotal scrutiny stakeholder in 2000 with a key report which sought to rebalance the relationship between parliament and government (HC 321 2000) , and staked a claim for its suitability as a forum through which the prime minister could be scrutinised. It championed the new format on the grounds that it would provide a 'calmer setting' for more 'productive and informative' scrutiny than was ordinarily available through Prime Minister's Questions (PMQs) due its 'confrontational exchanges and theatrical style ' (HC984 2002, para.3) . The scrutiny mechanism has now operated for over 13 years, and involved the questioning of three prime ministers. Yet despite constituting a remarkable institutional innovation in parliamentary practice, and 'a significant advance in the scrutiny of the Prime Minister' (Cowley 2007, 23) , it has gone largely unexamined by scholars.
We seek to address this gap in the academic literature. The article has two goals: to explain the institutional emergence and evolution of the Liaison Committee evidence sessions with the prime minister, and to assess their contribution to parliamentary scrutiny of the premier. First, we map the landscape of prime ministerial accountability to parliament, its changing nature across time, and review discussion on the perceived utility of PMQs as a mechanism for scrutinising the head of government, which is important given that the Liaison Committee sessions were advocated as both a complement and an antidote to them. Second, we explore the origins and evolution of the Liaison Committee evidence sessions with the prime minister, the institutional and political context in which the innovation occurred and has developed, and discuss the effectiveness of these sessions in enhancing accountability and oversight. We draw on a dozen interviews conducted with Liaison Committee members in 2007, when Tony Blair stepped down as prime minister and there was a natural opportunity for MPs to reflect on what the format had achieved after five years of operation.
We also utilise the evidence sessions transcripts, encompassing 11 sessions with Tony Blair, 5 with Gordon Brown, and 14 with David Cameron. Finally, we analyse the constraints faced by the Liaison Committee in delivering this scrutiny, and what these constraints tell us about the contemporary dynamics of prime ministerial accountability to parliament. In reflecting on the evidence sessions, the article contributes to our understanding of parliamentary scrutiny infrastructure, and to broader debates about the challenges of holding to account powerful prime ministers who sit at the centre of contemporary governance systems.
Prime ministerial accountability to parliament
Analysis of the prime minister has focused largely on the power of the office and the utilisation of that power by incumbents, and debates about the nature and style of prime ministerial power and predominance have been extensively debated in recent literature (Dowding 2013; Foley 2013; Heffernan 2003 Heffernan , 2005 Heffernan , 2013 Poguntke and Webb 2013) . Scholars have analysed the waxing and waning of the prime minister's central role, and the importance and impact of prime ministerial leadership to British governance structures and policymaking (Diamond 2014; Barber 2007) . The altered landscape of the core executive, with its contextual constraints under the 2010-15 coalition government, added a new layer to the understanding of the blend between personal and structural resource utilisation Heffernan 2012, 2015; Hazell and Yong 2012) .
This concentration on the centre of government has overshadowed scholarly analysis of the accountability relationship between the prime minister and parliament. Much is known about policy making, executive organisation, and internal cabinet relations, much less about prime ministerial accountability to the legislature. In part, this is because prime ministers do not have formal responsibility to parliament and remain largely subject to convention. The formal legal powers and financial resources in the British system are vested in the Secretaries of State. In the absence of the formal relationship that binds ministers to parliament, the prime minister is able to determine and configure the rules as he or she sees fit. In this context, Tony Blair was able to alter PMQs from 15 minutes twice a week on Tuesdays and Thursdays, to 30 minutes once a week on Wednesdays. The change was implemented during the immediate post-1997 'honeymoon' period without any parliamentary debate, and Blair later admitted that any such debate would probably have scuppered the reform (Blair 2010, 108) . The capacity of the prime minister to determine the parameters of his or her accountability is therefore considerable. As Hennessy (2000, 58) explains, 'the most powerful single individual in the land is also the effective quality controller and interpreter-in-chief of the rules of the game -a hugely important, though often overlooked, ingredient in the overmighty power of the British premiership.' To understand the relationship between prime minister and parliament, we must consider the basic elements of parliamentary accountability. 'Accountability' has its etymological roots in Norman English bookkeeping (Bovens 2007) , and, in Westminster-derived democracies in particular, many accountability measures are either focused on, or originate from, the close monitoring of government expenditure. The select committees established in 1979, for example, emerged from parliament's attempts to 'ensur[e] efficiency and 'value for money'' (Jogerst, 1993, 39) , and the committees were tasked explicitly with overseeing not just the expenditure of government departments, but departmental policy and administration also, in order to deliver more systematic executive scrutiny than had previously been possible (Kelso 2009, 95-8) . However, without a department, and thus without an associated select committee performing oversight tasks, the prime minister is arguably subject to less systematic parliamentary scrutiny than the members of his own cabinet. The departmental structure of the select committees has also facilitated the prime minister's historical refusal to appear before them. Certainly, the prime minister answers questions from MPs in the House of Commons, but if accountability involves finding out what has been done and why, then PMQs can be swiftly dismissed as an effective way of holding the prime minister to account, for it does neither.
There is, therefore, an obvious dislocation between theory and practice in much of British politics.
Theory has always stressed the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and championed the theoretical balance between the legislature and the executive. Yet as Kumarasingham (2013, 588) argues, 'the reality is that parliament, with its tight party control in the Westminster system, does not provide the horizontal accountability that it theoretically could.' This 'mismatch' is frequently cited as eroding the legitimacy of parliament (Rhodes 1997; Rhodes and Weller 2005; Shephard 2009; Thomas 2004) . At one level, the prime minister is delegated by parliament in the same way as are other government ministers (Strøm 2003) , and the prime minister remains in place only for as long as he or she can command the confidence of parliament. Yet, while the delegation appears clear enough, the associated accountability is highly contested.
The mismatch is exacerbated by a succession of prime ministers who have been seemingly uninterested in parliament when political capital can be generated successfully elsewhere. Dunleavy and Jones (1993) long ago established that prime ministers have become less engaged with parliament, in terms of answering questions, making statements and speeches, and intervening in debates. Their premise was that 'the prime minister's active participation in parliamentary proceedings is a key mechanism for ensuring the accountability of the executive' (Dunleavy and Jones 1993, 267) , and therefore that the prime minister was required to be present in the chamber in order to be 'active' (Thomas 2004) . In the period analysed, there was a long-term decline in prime ministers' speeches in the Commons, a stepped decline in debating interventions, and a significant Nonetheless, the key occasion for parliamentary oversight of the head of government is PMQs. It is the only parliamentary activity which features regularly in news coverage and which prompts significant volumes of political commentary. However, it has become routine in British politics to scoff at the idea that PMQs might be considered a forum capable of delivering meaningful scrutiny, and to marvel instead at the prime minister's skilled deployment of inventive strategies designed to avoid answering the questions asked. To the extent that PMQs was ever about obtaining information about government policy and decision making, and pressing for government action, it is now an occasion largely motivated by political performance, ritualistic humiliation, and the delivery of headline-grabbing one-liners. Complaints about its functioning have persisted even as PMQs reached the milestone in 2011 of fifty years of operation (Bercow 2012; Bates et al 2014) , and PMQs as a spectacle now trumps any semblance of formal prime ministerial accountability (Cowley and Stuart 2014; Hansard Society 2014) . While the format may be championed for its mettle-testing characteristics, its inability to facilitate detailed scrutiny of the head of government means that Hennessy's concerns noted above about 'the necessary restraint' of the prime minister remain live.
Yet, despite the criticisms routinely directed at PMQs, it remains a crucial parliamentary occasion and one which significantly challenges prime ministerial skills. Tony Blair described PMQs 'as the most nerve-racking, discombobulating, nail-biting, bowel-moving, terror-inspiring, couragedraining experience in my prime ministerial life' (Blair 2010, 109) . Of course, this emphasises the political and reputational aspects of PMQs, rather than its accountability consequences. Blair was quite candid on this point, declaring it to be 'rather a myth' that PMQs represented 'a great way of holding the prime minister to account': the accountability thesis, he argued, 'assumes that those asking the questions are interested to know the answers. In truth, the whole thing is a giant joust, a sort of modern, non-physical duel' (Blair 2010, 109) . He nevertheless maintained that the value of PMQs lay in the fact that a prime minister had to be 'clever, significantly past a basic intellectual threshold, otherwise you will be eaten alive' (Blair 2010, 393) , and argued that 'a run of really bad PMQs can put the leader in jeopardy' (Blair 2010, 111) . In this context, the format clearly delivers political goods that are considered valuable, even if those goods have little to do with accountability. This insight is crucial to understanding the emergence of the Liaison Committee sessions.
Origins of the Liaison Committee sessions
Secretaries of state and ministers have appeared regularly before departmental select committees since their creation in 1979, to give evidence about their policy responsibilities and departmental activities. However, despite the increasingly pre-eminent role played by departmental select committees in the decades following their formation, the prime minister did not appear before them.
1 The failure of the prime minister to be subject to select committee scrutiny was viewed by conferences emerged at a point in the Blair premiership when he was attempting to regain control of a domestic reform agenda which had stalled during the first term, and which was at serious risk of being further marginalised on account of the agenda-setting consequences of the terrorist attacks of September 11 th (Seldon 2007, 19-21, 47 ). Add to this the growing pressures Blair faced in his second term from the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, about the likely date of the controversial 'handover' the two men had agreed in 1994, along with the difficulties faced by Number 10 in leveraging
Treasury support for public sector reform (Seldon 2007, 21) , and we begin to understand the value for the prime minister of a forum through which he could talk extensively about his domestic policy agenda and his vision as head of government.
Consequently, the context in which these evidence sessions were agreed is crucial to understanding their character and evolution. As the prime minister initially refused requests to appear before the committee, his subsequent offer to attend dramatically changed the political terrain on which the process was negotiated. Rather than Blair acquiescing to a select committee request for his time, he instead offered himself to them. This reconfigured the underpinning political narrative, and subsequently enabled Blair to remind the Liaison Committee that he was giving evidence under his own initiative, and that he was the first premier ever to do so. The prime minister also offered more of his time than was requested: in 2000, the Liaison Committee suggested that he appear before them once a year, yet in 2002, Blair offered to appear twice a year. A generous interpretation might portray the prime minister as simply eager to contribute to deepened executive accountability, but a more realistic one would point out that, by not only offering to appear before the committee, but also to appear more often than had been requested, Number 10 was determining not only the rules of the political game, but also the nature of the ballpark on which it would be played.
The evolving scrutiny format
The first evidence session held by the Liaison Committee with the prime minister took place on 16
July 2002, and one committee member explained that it constituted 'a serious attempt to analyse the prime minister's leadership of policy direction ' (interview, June 2007) . In advance of the session, the chair of the Liaison Committee met with the committee members to discuss themes for exploration with the prime minister (interviews, June 2007). Four themes were chosen: the role of the prime minister inside government and his relationship with parliament, the delivery of public services, international affairs and the war on terror, and the quality of political life. These themes were communicated to the prime minister two weeks before the scheduled evidence session, to enable Number 10 to prepare, although the specific questions to be asked were not shared. The committee determined which MPs would pursue the agreed themes in their questions, and parliamentary clerks provided assistance, as standard, in terms of question preparation, although neither the committee generally nor the chair specifically decided the specific topic of MPs' questions, which was left to individuals to decide for themselves (interviews, June 2007).
The evidence session took place in a Portcullis House committee room, and lasted two and a half hours, with a total of 123 questions being asked and answered. Although few of those who championed the evidence sessions imagined that they would be an immediate panacea for parliament's scrutiny shortcomings, the first session was nevertheless perceived as a damp squib, and received mixed reviews in the press. While The Guardian leader (17 July 2002) described the occasion as 'much more informative and interesting' than PMQs, and one that 'showed parliament looking good too,' the same newspaper's sketch-writer, Simon Hoggart, likened it to being 'savaged by a feather duster.' Noting that the committee chair's 'long-winded introduction' had 'caused the prime minister to slump and to stare through glazed eyes at the desk in front of him', Hoggart concluded that 'this lot are just not very good at asking questions' (Hoggart 2002) . Similarly, The Independent (17 July 2002) described it as 'bloodless' and 'low-key', and at some remove from the 'fierce cross-examination' that had been anticipated. The questioning to which Blair was subjected was described diplomatically by the Daily Telegraph as 'respectful', while The Times observed that 'something had gone horribly wrong' because 'Tony Blair was evidently enjoying himself, which really wasn't the point of the exercise at all,' further noting that although some of the committee's most skilled inquisitors 'threatened thunder', the 'storm never broke.' The broadsheet press in general noted Blair's relaxed style, amiable grin, and his appearance in shirt-sleeves, all indicative, in their estimation, of the absence of any real testing of the premier.
Although the committee identified four discussion themes in advance, the vast terrain actually Yet even although the domestic policy theme was supposed to focus on tuition fees and foundation hospitals, it actually covered a broad range of domestic policy questions, such as transport, local government, and public sector targets. The committee subsequently restricted the number of participating MPs, to facilitate the sustained questioning that they were not yet fully realising. In restricting participation to around 8-12 MPs, the Liaison Committee later argued that this better reflected the normal size of a select committee oral evidence session (HC 954 2014, para.6). The length of the session was a further constraint on the scrutiny format, but one that took longer to resolve. Two and a half hours is a long time for uninterrupted questioning, and some MPs believed it contributed to the lack of focus (interviews, June/July 2007). After David Cameron became prime minister, he agreed to a new format of three ninety-minute hearings each year (HC 608ii 2011). This lent itself to fewer topics and thus, in theory, to more succinct questioning. The committee also sought to further restrict the range of topics by looking at areas where it believed the prime minister's input had been 'decisive or significant' (HC608i 2010, Q.2) and 'concentrating on areas where the Prime Minister makes a difference within government' (HC 954 2014, para.6).
Analysis of the accumulated transcripts since 2002 undoubtedly demonstrates the remarkable range of issues on which the Liaison Committee has quizzed the prime minister, and that this diversity has
continued across all three premiers, but it also demonstrates an effort over time to narrow the breadth of topics. While topic diversity might on the one hand point to the contingent nature of the premiership, and the value of scrutiny infrastructure that is responsive to different prime ministerial modes and policy interests, it also points to the desire of Liaison Committee MPs to pursue the policy specialisms of their own select committees. This is hardly surprising, although it does raise the question of whether the sessions generate breadth at the expense of depth. Yet, analysis of the sessions themselves compels a more nuanced conclusion on this point, because the range of topics explored has not always precluded the sort of detailed scrutiny the format was designed to facilitate.
The questioning faced by Tony Blair on public sector reform, for example, necessitated lengthy articulation of his policy approach, his sustained justification of the policy decisions taken, and explanation about why his chosen policy instruments were best placed to achieve the stated societal goals. Consequently, the questioning of Blair's successor, Gordon Brown, on this topic focused on how his premiership would differ in its approach to public service delivery, with Brown claiming a vision for more personalised and diverse public services that was subject to considerable interrogation (HC 192-i 2007, Q.1-27) . asked the Liaison Committee to take evidence on its behalf (HC200 2013, para.6), and it used that session to focus not just on the Rio summit, but also on other policy issues.
Constraints, contingencies and capabilities: the evidence sessions in perspective
Despite the evolution of the evidence sessions, and indications that the prime minister has been subjected to increasingly incisive and detailed questioning, critics of the format have persisted, with journalists in particular chiding it as a 'dull, but worthy' practice (White 2014) , and as a 'bore-athon' that does not leave 'blood on the carpet'' (Heppell and Theakston 2014) . MPs themselves continue to press for further improvements: Andrew Tyrie MP has called for monthly sessions Another member explained that Blair was:
such an accomplished performer, that your ability to get below his radar and be able to find out what was actually on his mind when he made particular decisions or [chose] particular policy directions, has actually been very frustrating, because I don't think we ever managed to do that (interview, June
2007)
In this respect, the constraints on the oversight capacity of these sessions were as much a function of the MPs' limited questioning skills as they were of Tony Blair's renowned communication abilities. Blair was apparently never anxious about his sessions with the Liaison Committee: while his memoir paints a colourful picture of his fear of PMQs (Blair 2010, 109-12) , it makes no mention of the Liaison Committee sessions he himself was instrumental in establishing. Similarly, when
David Cameron appeared before the committee in November 2010 and was informed by the chair that 'the purpose of these sessions … is quite different from Wednesday's Question Time', the prime minister's succinct, and revealing, response was, 'That's a relief' (HC 608 2010, Q.1).
While the sessions constitute an important source of engagement between parliament and prime minister, of a different character to that of PMQs, they have not proved to be an automatically Whatever their shortcomings, the evidence sessions have probably entrenched the principle that the prime minister should be held directly accountable to a parliamentary committee, and it would be hard, although not impossible, for future prime ministers to refuse to appear. Yet even if questions remain about the nature of the scrutiny delivered by these sessions, this simply highlights the necessity of adopting a more expansive view of their political and institutional utility. If we move beyond crude assumptions of scrutiny as an activity designed to triumphantly wrong-foot the prime minister and extract from him admissions of gross errors, then we can secure a far richer and more
illuminating understanding of what the purpose of scrutiny ought to be. Thus, perhaps the chief value of the evidence sessions is that they have offered a unique insight into prime ministerial thinking and approach to government. As one committee member explained in relation to Tony Blair:
the usefulness … has been the fact that he's been forced to lay out his thought processes, the discussion processes, even the structured processes that have meant that the government has got to a certain point on a certain subject matter (interview, June 2007).
The format of PMQs certainly does not afford these kinds of insights, whereas the committee format is far better positioned to delve into the justifications and philosophies which underpin prime ministerial approaches to government and policy making, precisely because it is designed to enable premiers to be quizzed at length on these themes.
There is also another perspective, in terms of what the prime minister gains from participation in these hearings. During his first appearance before the committee, Tony Blair stated that, to the extent that PMQs was '80 per cent theatre', the hearings would give him the opportunity 'to try to He also pointed both to the basic accountability function of the sessions and, significantly, to their capacity to strategically empower the prime minister, when he added that, in order to prepare, he had to 'check all that is happening in those specific areas', which he believed made it 'a force for good in government as well ' (HC 1015 ' (HC 2015 . That the evidence sessions represent a strategic resource both for parliament and for the prime minister is central to understanding their political and institutional dynamics.
By moving beyond 'blood-on-the-carpet' conceptualisations of parliamentary scrutiny, we can instead conceive of this format in broader and more useful terms. Ultimately, the Liaison Committee evidence sessions with the prime minister constitute a form of deliberative exchange between political elites. If discussion and debate are fundamental parliamentary activities, then these sessions deliver both in spades by bringing together Westminster and Whitehall elite actors in a remarkably intimate, yet still public, setting. The position of parliamentary elites is elevated by their privileged access to the prime minister, through which they are empowered not only to articulate their own views, but to quiz the premier on the wisdom of his policy approaches and decision making. The position of that most elite of government elites is also elevated in that it provides the prime minister with a public space for the lengthy articulation of his views on any number of crucial political issues, and affords him additional opportunities to delve into the workings of departments in the name of detailed preparation. Through the evidence sessions, these interlinked sets of elite actors meet in order to fulfil that most basic of parliamentary functions:
visible government answerability and accountability to elected representatives. The format undoubtedly requires further improvement and refinement. However, those who complain that the evidence sessions deliver too few political fireworks not only misunderstand the purpose of the occasion, but also fail to appreciate the fundamental value of executive answerability to the operation of parliamentary democracy.
Conclusion
The Liaison Committee evidence sessions with the prime minister represent a significant development in the relationship between the prime minister and parliament. There are certainly challenging questions about their future operation. Can a large committee be effective? How can the operation of the sessions be more flexible and responsive? Can insights from the sessions be more fully utilised elsewhere, particularly through other forms of parliamentary scrutiny work? Yet, it is probably too easy to overlook the innovative nature of these sessions in parliamentary terms, and it is worth noting that the format does not appear to have been replicated at national level anywhere else in the world. As one MP argued, 'people don't seem to realise just how revolutionary it is to have a prime minister sit in front of you for all those hours in public' (interview, June 2007).
MPs have been positive about the innovation, and the Political and Constitutional Reform Select
Committee argued that 'the Liaison Committee has the potential to be a very effective mechanism by which Parliament can hold the Prime Minister to account,' and that the evidence sessions bring 'a welcome balance to the superficial nature of Prime Minister's Questions' (HC 351 2014, 27) .
Their emergence and evolution demonstrate the reflexivity of parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms and the growing appetite amongst MPs for pursuing more rigorous accountability of government.
Furthermore, the symbolic act of enabling the prime minister to provide a detailed account of his decisions to MPs in an interrogatory environment is highly significant. The prime minister is the pre-eminent decision maker at the heart of UK central government, albeit one embedded in a complex web of relationships with other powerful ministerial actors, and the Liaison Committee's future management of prime ministerial scrutiny has the potential not just to enhance accountability processes, but also to reveal insights into the nature of government decision-making and the power of, and constraints on, the premiership.
